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SHORT-RUNVARIATIONS
IN FORECASTERS' PERFORMANCE
INCIDENCE OF FORECASTING ERRORS IN DIFFERENT PERIODS
A view often encountered in the financial and the business press is
that forecasters score and err collectively—that they generally do well
in some periods and go wrong in others. The reasons for the fore-
casters' "off years" are assumed to lie in some difficulties inherent in
the type of economic change that occurred at these particular times.
In other periods, when there were no such special hazards, forecasters
would presumably tend to be "right."
It is also sometimes alleged that forecasts are alike because most
of their authors tend to follow either a few reputed leaders or the
"herd instinct." This view may well have some validity, but clearly
no one has ever established just how much, since the originality of
forecasts is hardly subject to reliable measurement. It certainly is true
that forecasters interact in various ways. The important point here,
however, is that, since all forecasters must face the vicissitudes of eco-
nomic change at the same times, their products may all be similarly
affected. It is, therefore, nOt necessary to assume that they copy from
each other in order to explain why large errors may cluster in some
periods and be rare in others, or why errors may be generally in one
direction at one time and generally in the other direction at another.
A review of forecasters' performance in each successive year (or over
shorter periods) should help to answer such pertinent questions as
what the characteristics are of "good" and "bad" years for the fore-
casters and whether certain events surprise all forecasters in much the
same way or whether they generate errors that show substantial differ-
ences in size or type.
There is little doubt that some periods present much greater ob-Variations in Forecasters' Performance 21
stacles to the forecaster, and hence cause larger errors, than others.
In the period after World War II, the earliest years were apparently
the worst in this respect. The widespread failure of predictions in
these years is well known and has been ably analyzed.' In our mate-
rials, that failure is clearly documented. Quite generally, the forecast-
ers represented in our sample apparently expected a major decline
in economic activity to develop in 1947 and a smaller one again in
1948. Instead, large increases occurred in each of these years. As
shown by the accompanying figures, the average errors of forecasts of
annual percentage change for 1947—48 contrast sharply indeed with
the much smaller errors for the later postwar years (per cent).2
Gross National ProductIndustrial Production
1947—48 1949, 1954—631947—48 1949—63
With regard to sign —14.5 —1.1 —4.6 —1.0
Without regard to sign 14,5 2.1 4.6 3.6
This was, no doubt, a grave misjudgment of the situation that few
contemporary observers managed to avoid. But it is also true that the
disruption of economic relationships caused by the war made the early
postwar forecasts particularly vulnerable.3
In the forecasts of industrial production for 1950—51, very large
underestimation errors were made again (particularly over the spans of
twelve and eighteen months). Here the reason is, of course, obvious
(ex post facto), namely, the outbreak of the Korean War and its early
1 For a comprehensive appraisal, see Michael Sapir, "Review of Economic Fore-
casts for the Transition Period," Studies in Income and Wealth, 11, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, New York, 1949, pp. 273—367.
2 Because of trends, the mean values of the series for the two periods differ sub-
stantially; hence it is preferable here to use errors computed by taking differences
between the predicted and the actual percentage changes rather than errors based
on either levels or absolute changes. However, our conclusion on the inferiority of the
early postwar forecasts does not depend on which of these types of error measure-
mentare used. Nor is it invalidated by the fact that the averages for the post-1948
period conceal some large errors of opposite sign that partly offset each other. In
the data for GNP, the errors for 1947 and 1948 are larger than those in any of the
subsequent years covered. In the data for industrial production, only the year 1950
produced decidedly larger errors. (It should be noted that the samples for GNP and
industrial production include different forecasters and that the years 1950—53 are not
covered by the GNP data.)
5 Misspecified relationships seem to be responsible for a substantial share of errors
in these forecasts. The reliance on the projected consumption function of the 1930's
is a prime example (this involved underestimation of the effects of wartime accumu-
lation of both liquid assets—the wealth factor—and pent-up demand).22 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
consequences. As this was an exogenous event that could hardly have
been foreseen, these particular errors appear largely excusable.
The period since 1953 did not witness external "shocks" of compa-
rable magnitude, but clusters of large errors are nevertheless evident in
some of these years. Table 2 shows that the increases in GNP were
underestimated the most in the boom year 1955 (column 3). Conse-
quently, the level of GNP was also underestimated the most in that
year (Table 1, column 3). Errors of the same kind were also made in
1959 and 1961, which are again years of upswings following recessions,
and in 1963, when the economy showed unexpected vigor after a
retardation. But these movements were less vigorous than the expan-
sion of the mid-1950's, and the underestimation errors were less (the
second highest, on the average, were those made in the forecasts for
1963).
On the other hand, underestimation of the slowdown that was to
result from the recession of 1957—58 caused the predicted level of GNP
in 1958 to be too high. The same type of error was also common in the
forecasts for 1960, which turned Out tO be another recession year. The
retardation of 1962 was widely missed, with the result that the forecast
levels were again too high. Finally, the 1954 decline, as already noted,
proved to be milder than many forecasters had apparently anticipated.
But all these errors connected with phases of sluggishness were much
smaller than the underestimates relating to upswings or recoveries.
The results for industrial production are similar. Again, the largest
errors are the underestimates for 1955. These forecasts, however, pro.
duced overestimates of levels in all years marked by either recession or
retardation (including 1954) and also in 1956 and 1957. It should be
recalled that the behavior of GNP and industrial production in the
latter years differed considerably; the expansion of general economic
activity lasted through the first half of 1957, but in the manufacturing
sector it tapered off much earlier, coming to a virtual halt in 1956.
For total consumption expenditures as well as for GNP, 1955 was
the year when the forecasters made their largest errors and 1963 their
second largest (comparing once more the average errors of change for
each year since 1953). These were all underestimates of growth, the
predominant type of errors in consumption forecasts (see Table 7,
line 4).
Among the forecasts of gross private domestic investment, a variableVariations in Forecasters' Performance 23
with very different properties, 1955 was again marked by the largest
underestimation errors, though 1958 and 1959 were not far behind
• (in 1958, the large decline in the series was underestimated). Here, how-
ever, overestimates and turning-point errors were occasionally just as
conspicuous; diffusion and diversity, rather than concentration in time
and by type, seem to be characteristic of the errors of these forecasts
(Table 7).
YEAR-TO-YEAR COMPARISONS OF PREDICTED AND
ACTUAL CHANGES
Chart 1 shows the forecasts of annual changes in gross national product
for each of the eight sets A to H. In the left column, predicted
changes are superimposed upon the actual ones. In the right column,
the discrepancies between the two, i.e., the errors-of-change forecasts,
are plotted on the same scales. The same arrangement is used in Chart
2 for the forecasts of annual changes in industrial production.
The charts make it clear that the predicted changes generally fol-
lowed a course similar to that of the actual changes. This is true of
both GNP and industrial production. To be sure, the correspondence
is fairly close in some cases, very broad in others. It is not difficult to
discern visually the more important differences among these patterns,
which reflect major differences in accuracy (compare, for example, the
GNP forecasts E and F). But surely the main lesson of these charts is
that substantial positive correlations exist between the forecast changes
and the realizations for both variables. As this implies, the time pro-
files of the forecasts themselves also resemble each other considerably
in most cases.
The observed errors are on the whole much smaller than the corre-
sponding changes: as already noted, the forecasts are typically better
than last-level extrapolations which produce errors identical to the
recorded changes. The errors, too, tend to be positively correlated for
the different forecasts, consistently with the preceding comparisons.
This shows itself primarily in the directional agreement between
changes in the errors from one year to the next. This "co-movement"
tendency in errors is indeed striking.4
4 For GNP, errors of all forecasts change in the same direction in seven of the
ten intervals covered; in the remaining three intervals, all but one forecast (F) show
complete agreement in this respect. For industrial production, the agreement is only
slightly less pronounced.CHART 1
EightSets of Annual Forecasts of GNP, Actual and Predicted
Changes and Errors, 1953—63
—Actualchange —Error of predicted change ————Predicted change
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CHART I (concluded)
—Actual change
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CHART 2
Seven Sets of Annual Forecasts of Industrial Production, Actual and
Predicted Changes and Errors, 1953—63
—Actualchange —Error of predicted chonge ————Predicted change
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Finally, a comparison of Charts 1 and 2 discloses some significant
similarities between the forecast and error patterns for GNP and indus-
trial production. These reflect the correlation between the actual year-
to-year changes in the two variables.
FORECA5TING AND BUSINE55 CYCLE5
The year-to-year comparisons discussed with the aid of Charts 1 and 2
suggest that predictive errors are affected by the cyclical characteristics
of the forecast period. Table 3, which uses forecasts for quarters and
half-years, demonstrates this still more clearly. The levels of GNP and
industrial production are underestimated the most in the first year of
expansion, when the increases in these series are very large. Later in
the expansion, when the increases are usually smaller, the levels are
underestimated much less and may even be overestimated, as happened
in the unexpected retardation of 1962 (see Table 3, line 5). In contrac-
tions, overestimation of the levels is the rule, sometimes because the
downturn is missed and sometimes because the decline turns out to be
larger than predicted.
These cyclical differences among errors can be observed in forecasts
of different spans. For each of these stages—early recovery, later expan-
sion, contraction—there are signs of the familiar characteristic of errors
to increase with the forecast span. For the longest forecasts included,
the eighteen-month predictions of group D, the errors are about
equally large in the early and in the late expansion, and the interstage
differences are not significant statistically. Elsewhere, however, such
differences are definitely significant according to the analysis of van-
ance.6
5 Opposite cases, in which the decline was smaller than expected and as a result
the level was underestimated, also occurred (notably in the 1954 recession,as
observed earlier for the annual forecasts). These errors, however, are outweighed in
most of the contraction averages by the more frequent errors of the types referred to
in the text.
6 The results of that analysis are summarized below. The computed F-values are
• the ratios of the greater to the lesser estimate of variance, in this case, of the
variance of error between cycle phases to the variance of error within cycle phases.
GNP Forecasts
(all spans)Indus. Product. Forecasts (D)
A C 6 mos.12 mos. 18 mos.
computed F-ratio 6.428.9 10.4 5.0 1.6
5 per cent level of F-ratio 3.7 3.2 &S 3.3 3.728 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
TABLE 3
Selected Forecasts of GNP and Industrial Production: Mean Errors




Span of Forecast (months) All
ThreeSixNine Twelve Fifteen Eighteen Spans
Line and Stage8 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean Errors of GNP Forecastst (billion dollars)
Set A, 1949, 1955_63c
1.Recovery —18.2 —20.2 —19.2
2.Upswing —3.5 —5.6 —4.4
3.Contraction —0.9 +2.8 +1.0
Set C, 19582d
4.Recovery —6.6—11.7 —14.7—20.3—32.6 —14.0
5.Upswing +1.5+3.7+3.4+3.6 +1.2 +2.9
6.Contraction +0.1+4.7+8.9+9.2+9.6 +4.6
Mean Errors of Industrial Production Forecasts e
(1947-49=100)
Set D, i947-62 .
7.Recovery —5.7 —6.9 —10.4 —7.1
8.Upswing —1.2 —4.8 —10.3 —4.4
9.Contraction +3.6 +4.8 —0.4+3.2
8The following terms are used for brevity: recovery =thefirst year of expansion;
upswing =therest of expansion. The classification attempts. to approximate as
closely as possible the NBER business cycle chronology.
bE of level forecasts.
CBased on forecasts for the first and second half of the coming year.
dBasedon forecasts made quarterly for sequences of four quarters ahead.
eEors of level forecasts. The forecasts for the span in column 6 cover the
period from 1948 through the first half Of 1956.
Based on forecasts made twice in the year for two or three semiannual periods
ahead.Variations in Forecasters' Performance 29
TO understand how such results might occur, let us distinguish two
predictive patterns, both of which would underestimate current cycli-
cal changes, though in very different ways. First, imagine a series of
forecasts which reproduces well, but with a short lag, the fluctuations
in the actual series. The observed cyclical amplitudes need not be
underestimated but the current changes at certain stages of the cycle
will be. Second, imagine a series of forecasts which reproduces well the
trend, but not the cyclical movements, of the actual values. The pre-
dictions simply cut .across the fluctuations, so that both the cyclical
amplitudes and the current short-period changes are underestimated.
Some forecasts resemble more the lagging cyclical model, others
the trend-projection model. In Chart 3, the former is illustrated by
forecast C and the latter by forecast G, for GNP during 1958—61. Both
these sets consist of forecasts made for several quarters ahead, which
in the chart are linked together into chains that fan out to the right
from points representing the forecasters' estimates of the current posi-
tion. The forecasts are made twice or four times in a year, hence
the chains overlap. The C chains have "kinks" in 1958 and 1960—61,
which lag behind the turning points in GNP; the G chains show no
kinks at all.
Forecasts of the trend-projection type may come out rather well in
measures of average error if they have no large bias, that is,if they
neither underestimate nor overestimate the trend substantially.7 It is
clear, however, that such forecasts must be regarded as failures as far
as recognition of turning points is concerned. The chain forecasts with
cyclical patterns can be more useful in this role, even when they are
late.
7Thequarterly chain forecasts G for 1955—63 do show a significant overestimation
bias for both GNP and industrial production (see Tables 9 and 10 and accompany-
ing text). Incidentally, the annual forecasts G show little over-all bias merely because
their underestimation errors in earlier years, 1953—57, largely offset the later over-
estimates (see Tables I and 2).30 Short-Term Economic Forecasts
CHART 3
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